Corporate governance at community banks: a Seventh District analysis by Robert DeYoung et al.
Chicago Fed Letter
Corporate governance at community banks:
A Seventh District analysis
by Robert DeYoung, senior economist and economic advisor, Patrick Driscoll, managing examiner, Bank Supervision,
and Colette A. Fried, assistant vice president, Bank Supervision
Community banks can be vulnerable to the same economic tensions and conflicts of interest
that have compromised corporate governance at more high-profile firms over the past few
years. The authors discuss their preliminary findings from a project designed to construct
a systematic database on the corporate governance practices at District community banks.
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Corporate managers make daily business
decisions that determine how most of
the resources in our economy are used,
and they almost always make these de-
cisions without consulting their stock-
holders, the owners of the resources.
Corporate governance—one of the foun-
dational concepts of a
capitalist society—is the
set of public laws and
regulations, private rules,
and informal practices
designed to directly con-
trol or indirectly influence
corporate managers to
make decisions that bene-
fit stockholders and society
rather than themselves.
In the American corpo-
rate governance frame-
work, the interests of
stockholders in publicly
traded firms are protected
largely by three institu-
tions. A board of directors,
elected by stockholders,
hires and monitors the activities of the
firm’s management. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
the firm’s management to publish regu-
lar financial statements that are reviewed
and certified by outside auditors. And
the stock market, made up of various in-
vestors, offers daily opinions on the health
of the firm by translating public informa-
tion into a higher or lower stock price.
Until recently, what makes for “good”
and “bad” corporate governance has
chiefly been debated by financial theo-
rists in professional journals and by
financial practitioners and company
directors in boardrooms. But with news
of the fraudulent practices of some top
managers at high-profile firms like Enron,
Tyco, and WorldCom—as well as the
revelations of questionable accounting
practices and the appearance of exces-
sive managerial compensation at other
firms—corporate governance has be-
come the focus of very public debate.
In response to the scandals, Congress
passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
aimed at improving the quality of au-
dits, enhancing the financial expertise
of directors, and increasing the account-
ability of managers at publicly traded
firms. While the corporate governance
environment at commercial banks can
be quite different from that found in
most other U.S. corporations, banks can
be vulnerable to the same underlying
economic tensions and conflicts of inter-
est among managers, stockholders, and
the public interest. Although very few
commercial banks have failed in recent
years, virtually all of these insolvencies
were related to improper managerial
behavior and ineffective controls (e.g.,
First National Bank of Keystone in 1999
and Oakwood Deposit Bank in 2002).
This Chicago Fed Letter reports on a re-
search project we are conducting at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago on
1. Community banks in the Seventh District
Profitability
Average return on assets 1.06
Average return on equity 10.89
Other characteristics
Average assets $251.4 million
Less than 10 years old 12.0
Subchapter S corporations 31.3
Non-lead affiliates in multibank holding companies 12.8
Located in a metropolitan statistical area
  (urban market) 39.3
Publicly traded 10.4
NOTES: All numbers in percent unless stated otherwise. The year-end 2004 data used
for this figure are from a sample comprising 115 commercial banks with state charters
and Federal Reserve System membership. A Subchapter S corporation is a form of
corporation, allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for most companies with 75 or
fewer shareholders, which enables the company to enjoy the benefits of incorporation
but taxes earnings only at the shareholder level, thus avoiding the corporate income tax.the state of corporate governance prac-
tices at community banks in the Seventh
Federal Reserve District and the rela-
tionships between those practices and
bank performance.1
Corporate governance at community
banks
Over 90% of the commercial banks in
the U.S. can be described as “community
banks.” Community banking companies
are small firms, most having less than
$1 billion in assets, and are typically
closely held.2 For community banks that
are owner-operated (i.e., the top man-
agers and their families hold the con-
trolling interest in the bank), there may
be less scope for conflicts of interest
between management and stockhold-
ers because these two sets of people
largely overlap. However, because these
banks are not publicly traded, they do
not receive potentially useful monitor-
ing and feedback from investors in the
stock and bond markets.
Owner-operated or not, all commer-
cial banks have an additional outside
monitor not present at most other cor-
porations: federal and/or state bank
supervisors. Bank supervisors regularly







from the expenses of com-
pliance, the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act has had less
impact on corporate gov-
ernance at U.S. commer-
cial banks than at nonbank
corporations because
banks have been exposed
to stricter regulatory scru-
tiny for quite some time.
In their role as outside
monitors, state and feder-
al bank supervisors have
long sought to foster strong
corporate governance
practices at community
banks, with the recogni-
tion that best practices at
these small privately held
organizations may differ




One key objective of our project at the
Chicago Fed is the construction of a
database that describes the corporate
governance environment at community
banks. The data we present and analyze
here for banks in the Seventh District
were collected as part of the regular
examination process. These data were
collected both off-site (from previous
examination records and internal super-
visory databases) and on-site (from inter-
views with bank managers and internal
bank documents), and were then com-
bined with financial statement informa-
tion from standing regulatory databases
(the Federal Deposit and Insurance
Corporation’s Reports of Income and
Condition or “call reports”).3
These data were collected during bank
examinations conducted in late 2003
and early 2004, and they reflect the cor-
porate governance environment that
existed at each bank prior to 2004.
Banks were included in the database
only if they were headquartered in the
Seventh District, were state chartered,
were members of the Federal Reserve
System, and could arguably be considered
as community banks. We exclude from
our analysis any bank that sustained a
material change in control or top man-
agement between 2001 and 2004, as
well as any bank for which information
was substantially incomplete. This left
us with 115 banks in the database, out
of a possible 185 community banks in
the Seventh District in 2004.
Profile of the community banks
Figure 1 describes the size, financial
performance, and organizational details
of our sample banks based on finan-
cial data from 2004. The average bank
had about $250 million in assets, but size
ranged widely from about $10 million to
as much as $3 billion. Bank profits also
varied substantially: return on assets
(ROA) averaged 1.06% and ranged from
–0.26% to 2.55%, while return on equity
(ROE) averaged 10.89% and ranged
from –2.69% to 25.68%. A substantial
minority of the banks were located in
urban markets (39.3%), and/or were
organized as Subchapter S corporations
(31.3%). Smaller percentages were af-
filiated with multibank holding compa-
nies (MBHCs), were newly chartered
“de novo” banks less than ten years old,
and/or were publicly traded corporations.
Figure 2 displays selected information
on the corporate governance environ-
ment at the typical community bank in
the Seventh District. The daily manag-
ing officer (DMO) is responsible for
making the day-to-day operating deci-
sions; this person is usually the presi-
dent or chief executive officer (CEO)
of the bank.4 The typical DMO owned
10.7% of the bank’s stock, and this
ownership stake accounted for 39.6%
of the DMO’s personal wealth. An ad-
ditional 13.9% of the average bank was
owned by the DMO’s immediate family
members—a clear illustration of the
closely held, owner-operator environ-
ment at most community banks—while
large shareholders (holdings greater
than 5%) who were unrelated to the
DMO’s family held a 14% stake. Over-
all, members of the board of directors
(including the DMO and his or her
family) held a 40.4% stake at the aver-
age bank. In addition, 14.8% of the
banks had employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs).
The typical DMO had been at the job for
over 11 years and received a $146,000
base salary with a $39,000 cash bonus.
About 43% of the DMOs had contrac-
tual incentives linking their pay to the
financial performance of the bank,
Bank ownership
DMO ownership stake 10.7
DMO ownership as share of personal wealth 39.6
DMO family ownership stake 24.6
Board of director ownership stake 40.4
Large block (>5%) non-DMO family ownership stake 14.0
Banks with employee stock ownership plans 14.8
DMO status and pay
Hired DMO (with less than 1% ownership stake) 41.2
DMO tenure 11.4 years
Formal succession plan in place 54.0
DMO base pay $146,340
DMO bonus pay $39,110
DMO contract contains performance incentives 43.2
DMO received stock options 22.1
DMO received stock grants 11.3
Director status and pay
Outside directors 62.6
Director age 59.1 years
Director tenure 14.5 years
Director pay (lump sum) $2,724
Director pay (per meeting) $418
Director attendance 92.7
Boards that sometimes meet without DMO 25.4
Mandatory director training 21.4
Limits on number of other boards 2.9
NOTES: All numbers in percent unless stated otherwise. The data used for this figure
were collected in late 2003 and early 2004 from a sample comprising 115 commer-
cial banks with state charters and Federal Reserve System membership, and reflect
corporate governance conditions present at these banks during 2003. DMO refers to
daily managing officer.
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3. Corporate governance and profitability
Return Return
on assets on equity
54% of the banks had a formal Adopting a formal plan is a 13% an 11%
management succession plan in place. associated with: increase. increase.
On average, top managers received A 10% increase in this a 0.4% a 0.5%
$39,100 of their pay as a cash bonus. bonus is associated with: increase. increase.
On average, bank directors received A 10% increase in this a 0.5% a 0.5%
$2,724 in lump sum compensation. amount is associated with: decrease. decrease.
On average, top managers had 39.6% A 10% increase in this no significant a 0.7%
of their personal wealth invested in percentage is associated change. decrease.
bank stock. with:
NOTE: Based on results of regression analysis as described in the article.
advocate that banks have such plans in
place. We do not argue that the mere
existence of such a plan buoys profits;
rather, this result likely indicates that
forward-looking banks that are attentive
to this one managerial best practice
are likely to be attentive to other prof-
it-enhancing controls and managerial
best practices as well.
Our regressions suggest that banks per-
form better when their managers and
directors face the proper monetary in-
centives. Paying managers bonuses—as
opposed to straight salary—is associated
with higher profitability. According to
the regression estimates, a 10% increase
in DMO bonus pay is associated with
about a 0.4% improvement in bank ROA
and a 0.5% improvement in bank ROE.
(We found similar results when we ex-
pressed DMO bonus pay as a share of
base pay or bank assets.) Our estimates
also suggest that bank directors respond
to monetary incentives, but unfavor-
ably so in this case: a 10% increase in
lump sum director compensation is as-
sociated with about a 0.5% reduction
in both ROA and ROE, an indication
that rewarding directors regardless of
their efforts may result in less active
monitoring of bank management. (We
found similar results when we expressed
lump sum director pay as a share of
bank assets.) Again, we stress that these
findings are merely statistical associations
while 22.1% and 11.3% had received
stock options and stock grants, respec-
tively, during the past four years. The
DMO was a “hired manager” at 41.2%
of the banks, which we define as a DMO
with less than a 1% ownership stake in
the bank.
Outside directors (i.e., non-managers)
made up about 63% of the boards of
directors. The typical director was about
59 years old and sat on the board for
over 14 years. On average, directors
received $2,724 in lump sum pay (i.e.,
regardless of their efforts) each year and
$418 per board meeting attended, and
they attended 92.7% of the scheduled
meetings. Only about one-quarter of
these boards ever met without the DMO
being present.  Finally, only about 21%
of the banks required mandatory train-
ing for their directors, and only about
3% of the banks limited the number of
other boards upon which their directors
could sit.
Preliminary analysis of the data
A second key objective of our project is
to determine whether and how corpo-
rate governance practices influence the
financial performance of our sample
banks. The ultimate related objective is
to identify a set of corporate governance
“best practices” for community banks.
The results we report here mark the be-
ginning of this endeavor; although some
of these findings are encouraging, at this
point they are exploratory in nature.
Using multiple regression analysis, we
tested whether any of the corporate
governance characteristics measured as
of 2003 for our sample banks are statisti-
cally related to the ROA or ROE earned
by these banks in 2004. We began with
simple baseline models in which the
banks’ ROA and ROE in 2004 were re-
gressed on the six “other characteristics”
listed in figure 1 for the same year.5
Together, these six characteristics ex-
plained about 32% of the variation in
ROA across banks and about 40% of the
variation in ROE. Bank profitability was
positively and statistically significantly
related to bank size, Subchapter S status,
and MBHC affiliation, and negatively
and statistically significantly related to
de novo status, urban location, and
publicly traded status.6
We then tested whether the corporate
governance characteristics displayed in
figure 2 for 2003 helped further explain
the differences in ROA and ROE across
community banks in 2004. When we
added each of these characteristics in-
dividually to the regression equations,
only six were statistically related to ROA
or ROE. Moreover, when we added all
six of these characteristics simultaneously
to the regression equations, only four—
DMO bonus pay, DMO ownership as a
share of personal wealth, director lump
sum pay, and formal succession plan in
place—retained their statistical signifi-
cance. Together, these four measures
explain an additional 11% of the varia-
tion in ROA across banks and an addi-
tional 10% of the variation in ROE.
These findings are summarized in fig-
ure 3. Profitability is 13% higher in terms
of ROA (i.e., 1.20% instead of 1.06%)
and 11% higher in terms of ROE (i.e.,
12.09% instead of 10.89%) at commu-
nity banks with formal management
succession plans in place. Succession
planning is recognized as a good cor-
porate governance practice in all in-
dustries, and bank supervisors strongly1 The Seventh Federal Reserve District
comprises all of Iowa and most of Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
2 There is no strict definition for a “commu-
nity bank,” although it is not uncommon
for analysts to use a crude upper bound
at $1 billion or $5 billion in assets. For a
discussion, see R. DeYoung, 2004, “Com-
munity banks at their best: Serving local
financial needs,” 2004 Annual Report,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, available
at www.chicagofed.org/about_the_fed/
annual_report_new.cfm.
3 Anna Drozdzynski, Yumna Farooqi, and
Syed Hussain were instrumental in the
final aggregation and review of these data.
4 The DMO designation was assigned by
examiners, following the convention used
in R. DeYoung, K. Spong, and R. J. Sullivan,
2001, “Who’s minding the store? Motivating
and monitoring hired managers at small,
closely held commercial banks,” Journal
of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25, No. 7, pp.
1209–1244.
5 To remove the influence of outlying values,
we truncated the values of ROA, ROE, and
the corporate governance characteristics
at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their
sample distributions.
6 The last of these six results was not expect-
ed—publicly traded firms arguably face
greater earning pressure—and may simply
reflect idiosyncrasies among the small
number (12) of publicly traded banks in
our sample.
7 For example, although we measure man-
ager bonuses in 2003 and bank earnings in
2004, our results may partially reflect causa-
tion running from high earnings to high
bonuses because well-run banks tend to
generate above-average profits every year.
and by themselves do not constitute
evidence of causation.7
Perhaps the most intriguing result is the
relationship we find among the DMO’s
personal wealth, the DMO’s ownership
stake in the bank, and the bank’s prof-
itability ratios. A 10% increase in the
share of the DMO’s personal wealth that
is invested in the bank is associated with
a 0.7% decrease in a bank’s ROE, but is
unrelated to a bank’s ROA. The most like-
ly explanation for these results is mana-
gerial risk aversion: non-diversified DMOs
invested heavily in bank stock operate
their banks with larger-than-optimal eq-
uity capital cushions in order to hedge
their own personal financial risk. This
leaves ROA unchanged, but it not only
reduces the return on investment earned
by the other stockholders, it also con-
strains the bank’s growth opportunities.
Conclusion
The findings presented here are part of
a broader supervisory effort to evaluate
best practices corporate governance at
community banks. The findings are pre-
liminary in nature and are based on the
performance of a relatively small sample
of community banks from a limited geo-
graphic area in a single year. Further-
more, while we do find a number of
statistical associations between a handful
of corporate governance characteristics
at community banks in 2003 and the
financial performance of these banks in
2004, we are not implying that these fac-
tors in any sense “caused” or “predicted”
that financial performance. Establishing
such a finding would require additional
data and more sophisticated analysis
than we employ here.
We see these findings as a first step to-
ward the overall objectives of the re-
search project: to construct a systematic
database on the corporate governance
practices at community banks, to deter-
mine whether and how these practices
are related to banks’ financial perfor-
mance, and to use these findings to
evaluate the efficacy of best practices
management and governance proce-
dures encouraged by bank supervisory
agencies. Establishing good corporate
governance practices at commercial
banks is a natural complement to the
ongoing safety and soundness objectives
of bank supervision. These practices
will benefit bank shareholders and bank
depositors, as well as help strengthen
the financial system in general.